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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND 
THE EXTERNAL SECURITY POLICY OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION
This paper presents the overview of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine 
implementation  to  the  European  Union  Security  and  Defense  policy.  In 
this context,  the references on the notion of R2P  in  the EU documents are 
traced. The article defines the main barriers for the effective and progressive 
implementation of the mentioned doctrine. Special attention  is paid to the 
EU participation  in  the  establishment of  the  internationalized  criminal  and 
human rights tribunals as a form of R2P implementation.
INTRODUCTION
European Union security depends not only on the effective internal 
measures that are planned to prevent terrorist attacks or any other threats. 
The significant part of the security policy are the preventive mechanisms 
(we can call them external part of the security policy) that aim to ensure 
the world stability and peace. For the highly globalized countries and 
sui generis formations, which in addition play the role of world power, 
it is very important to take part in the maintaining of peace in the world. 
Passive defense and security policy can lead to the splash of unanswered 
threats. US realized this after the 9/11. Europe is in the process of rec-
ognizing this1. Unfortunately, starting and developing of active security 
policy is connected with the tragedies. European states faced them in 
London 2005, Madrid 2004, Burgas 2012, Donbas and Crimea 2014. All 
these examples differs from each other but all are linked with the global 
political problems outside EU.
Undertaking of preventive measures should have some internation-
al law form just to avert the chaos in international relations. In earlier 
times states used different conceptions to prove their right for the pre-
ventive measures in order to ensure own security (self-defense, preemp-
tory self-defense, collective self-defense, self-help etc.) One of the latest 
doctrines that is highly accepted by the UN is a Responsibility to Pro-
tect (R2P) doctrine. It is directly mentioned in the official EU documents 
and is recognized as lawful mean for the maintenance of the obeisance 
of international human rights standards and other preemptory norms of 
international law. I recognize that thesis about human rights protection 
1 Kaunert Ch., Leonard S., Pawlak P. (2012). European Homeland Security: 
A  European Strategy in the Making? New York: Routledge.
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may sound in a way that Western superpowers are exporting their stan-
dards and rules to other countries to make them more predictable and 
appeasable. However, in this point, I cannot but agree with the position 
of the prominent Austrian philosopher and lawyer Hans Kelsen: “The at-
tempts to substantiate the idea that states are permitted to behave as they 
want support imperialism but not a sovereignty”1. In this connection, 
I consider R2P more as an instrument for preventing imperialism and 
permissiveness then an excuse for the sovereignty limiting.
In this paper, I would like to challenge how EU can implement R2P 
doctrine. The first part will deal with the general explanation what is R2P 
doctrine. The second part will be devoted to the issue of R2P doctrine 
implementation to the EU defense and security policy. Finally, the third 
one will consist of examination of possibility of the EU participation in 
the creation and administration of the criminal and human rights tribu-
nals ad hoc.
PART I.  
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CONCEPT IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine in its consolidated form was 
firstly formulated in the report of the International Commission on In-
tervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 20012. The report starts with 
the analysis of state sovereignty as a defi ning principle of interstate re-
lations and a foundation of the world order3. At the same time, the UN 
Charter`s provisions about the actions which the UN Security Council 
can undertake in situations of the “threat to the peace, a breach of the 
peace or an act of aggression” are examined as a state sovereignty limita-
tion statement.4 Authors of the report consider that sovereignty belongs 
rather to peoples than to states.5 This formulation seems a modernized 
and not extremely controversial modification of Scelle’s thoughts about 
the state as an agent of the real subjects of international law – people6.
1 Kelsen, H. (2009). General Theory of Law and State. Harvard: Harvard University 
Press.
2 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The 




6 Cassese, A. (1990).Remarks on Scelle`s Theory of “Roles Splitting” (dedoublement 
fonctionnel) in International Law. EJIL, No. 210.
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In the Report the humanitarian intervention was considered as an ef-
fective and appropriate measure for the protection of human life, free-
dom and dignity1. The legality of intervention is advocated despite the 
ICJ design in Nicaragua v United States case, where it was stated that 
“where human rights are protected by international conventions, that 
protection takes the form of such arrangements for monitoring or ensur-
ing the respect for human rights as are provided for in the conventions 
themselves ... In any event ... the use of force could not be the appro-
priate method to monitor or ensure such respect”2. Among non-military 
forms of intervention international economic and political sanctions and 
international criminal prosecution figure in the ICISS report3.
On the base of the ICISS Report 2001, the Permanent Representative 
of Canada in the UN issued the letter on 26 July 20024. Formulations 
from the letter constitute more persuading than in 2001 Report evince of 
the domination of military way of understanding of intervention5.
As Natalie Oman rightly notes, ICISS in its conclusions came to the 
fact that R2P, while not yet an established principle of customary in-
ternational law, is “crystallizing” as an “emerging guiding principle”6. 
The fact that sovereignty cannot be the justifier of anti-human actions 
is possible to find in the Aaland Island Case, Southwest Africa advisory 
opinion, Western Sahara and Namibia cases7. In the letter of Canada’s 
permanent representative in the UN it was mentioned that non-interven-
ing in some particular situations (Rwanda) causes the same critics as in-
tervention does8. If we accept this position, it is then possible to explain 
why R2P notwithstanding its controversial character can be treated as an 
emerging guiding principle of international law.
1 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The 
Responsibility to Protect. <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>
2 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America); Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility 
of the Application, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 26 November 1984.
3 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The 
Responsibility to Protect. <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>
4 Letter dated 2002/07/26 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. UN Documents Database. <http://www.
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/57/303>
5 Ibid.
6 Oman, N. (2009). The Responsibility to Prevent’: A Remit for Intervention? Canadian 
Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 22, 218–249.
7 Ibid.
8 Letter dated 2002/07/26 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. UN Documents Database. <http://www.
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/57/303>
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R2P is not a pure doctrinal disquisition. After its formulating in 2001, 
it was reaffirmed by the states practice and mentioned in several funda-
mental international documents. Thus, the final statement of UN’s 2005 
World Summit and the Security Council Resolution number 1674 con-
tains the direct acceptance of R2P principle1. The UN Secretary General 
report concerning the implementation of the responsibility to protect (in 
support of the South Sudan Permanent Representative to the UN Francis 
M. Deng position) qualify sovereignty as an obligation2. The wording of 
statute of African Union differs from the statute of the Organization of 
African Union3. Recent document language maintains the non-indiffer-
ence but not the non-interference4. This change of accents seems very 
symbolic.
In the ICISS report the SC resolution as a ground for the military in-
tervention was considered mandatory5. Still, nonmilitary types of inter-
vention do not need some special justification from the SC6.
As we can see from the short analysis of state sovereignty doctrine, 
the sovereignty of the state cannot be perceived as an absolute. That is 
why protective intervention is not only theoretical and dead conception. 
States responsibility to protect is connected with obligations under the 
international treaties and especially with the erga omnes obligations. In 
cases when some state enroach on human rights, violate other erga omnes 
obligations, implementation of the R2P doctrine seems necessary. Ap-
plying of the doctrine raise the question of corporate veil and use of the 
R2P in geopolitical purposes. SC sanctions for the military intervention 
and consensus of the world community for the non-military measures are 
the best today options for minimizing the allegations in improper use of 
R2P. Certainly, the mentioned above accusations cannot but will arise.
1 Implementing the responsibility to protect: report of the Secretary-General. A/63/677 




5 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 
The Responsibility to Protect. <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.
pdf>; Letter dated 2002/07/26 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. UN Documents Database. 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/57/303>; Implementing 
the responsibility to protect: report of the Secretary-General. A/63/677 (12 January 
2009). UN Documents Database. <http://undocs.org/A/63/677>
6 Ibid.
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PART II.  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R2P CONCEPT TO THE EU 
DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY
The European Union is interested in implementation of the R2P 
doctrine because of two main reasons: sharing the responsibility in 
human rights protection and maintenance of peace all over the world; 
personal interest in security ensuring and self-positioning as an influential 
global political player. The second reason is obvious. As for the first 
reason it is interesting to look at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
judgment in the case of Muslims from Srebrenica. The Court ruled 
that the Netherlands peacekeepers should share the responsibility for 
the tragedy in Srebrenica in 1995 as far as they deported 300 Muslims 
from the peacekeepers base and did not ensured their safety1. This case 
illustrates that today we can speak not only about moral obligation, but 
also about the emerging of legal obligation to help potential victims in 
other countries exists.
In the beginning, I would like to touch the question of formal 
incorporation of the R2P into EU official documents. This doctrine 
can be traced in the following legal acts: the European Consensus on 
Development; European Security Strategy; EU-Africa Joint Strategy 
(First and Second Action Plans); EU Situation Room tasks; EU 
Parliamentary Resolutions concerning the Darfur Crisis and Libya 
Crisis. All these documents consist direct mentions of the R2P. They 
proclaim deep understanding of the impossibility of staying by the 
crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; threats that 
these crimes can cause for the world community in general and the EU 
particularly. National legal acts of Germany, UK, Denmark, Norway and 
France also contain references to the R2P.
According to the mentioned above documents, the EU understand 
under the R2P the following measures or their complexes:• 
strengthening of the regional and sub-regional organizations role in the 
coordination of the donor support in the area of conflict prevention2;
• participation of UN peacekeepers in the protection of population 
(even without the consent from the government3);
1 Netherlands Held Liable for 300 Deaths in Srebrenica Massacre. New York Times. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/world/europe/court-finds-netherlands-
responsible-for-srebrenica-deaths.html?_r=0>
2 The European Consensus on Development. European Commission official site. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/eu_consensus_en.pdf>
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• cooperation with the International Criminal Court1;
• imposing a travel bans and freezing the financial assets of 
government members2;
• installation of no-fly zones3;
• conflict prevention and peace support activities4.
Such understanding of the R2P is adequate in comparison with 
the international law documents that describe the doctrine. One more 
important issue in the regard of R2P is the so-called early warning 
instrument. In 2009, the UN General Secretary provided report on the 
topic of early warning where he stated that this is the crucial analytic tool 
for the identifying of fragile situations and risks associated with them5. 
General Secretary noted that regional organizations (as far as sui generis 
formations) should be involved to this process of early warning6. As for 
the EU, its Situation Room can carry out the tasks of early warning7. It is 
desirable to include the direct mention and description of early warning 
to the Situation Room authorizing documents.
Summing up all mechanisms which international community can use 
to realize the R2P doctrine it is possible to divide them into following 
categories:
• early warning (as a not self-sufficient tool which may possible 
early reaction and early engagement)8;
• political and economic measures (direct involvement by the 
UN Secretary-General; fact-finding missions, friends groups, 
eminent persons commissions; dialogue and mediation through 
good offices; international appeals; non-official dialogues and 
1 European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2008 on Sudan and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). European Parliament official site. <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0238+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>
2 Libya: EU imposes arms embargo and targeted sanctions. The Council of the EU. <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119524.pdf>
3 Ibid.
4 Joint Africa-EU Strategy 2014-2017 // Fourth EU-Africa Summit. Site Africa-
EU partnership. <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/
documents/2014_04_01_4th_eu-africa_summit_roadmap_en.pdf>
5 Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect Report of the Secretary-
General. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect Official Site. <http://
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/N1045020%281%29.pdf>
6 Ibid
7 The EU Situation Room. EU External Actions Official website. <http://eeas.europa.
eu/crisis-response/what-we-do/eu-situation-room/index_en.htm>
8 Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect Report of the Secretary-
General. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect Official Site. <http://
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/N1045020%281%29.pdf>
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problem-solving workshops; political sanctions; diplomatic 
isolation; suspension of organization membership; travel and asset 
restrictions on targeted persons; “naming and shaming”);
• economic measures (promises of new funding or investment or 
favorable trade terms; trade and financial sanctions; withdrawal 
of investment; withdrawal of international financial institutions 
support; curtailment of aid and other assistance);
• legal measures (offers of mediation and arbitration; adjudication 
through ad hoc tribunals, domestic trials using universal 
jurisdiction or ICC; monitors to observe compliance with human 
rights standards);
• military measures (stand-off reconnaissance; consensual 
preventive deployment; the threat to use force)1.
In terms of the mechanisms nature, they can be contingently divide 
into two groups: sanctions type and non-sanctions type mechanisms. 
From the procedural and political point of view, the difference between 
these two types is considerable. It was illustrated by Ukrainian crisis 
that achieving of consensus on sanctions is very problematic as far as 
all states first tries to observe their own interests. In fact, the clumsiness 
of the EU in adoption of sanctions is its fee for not caring the name of 
federation.
The right to undertake initiatives concerning sanctions lies with 
any member state and with the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (can act also with the support of the 
European Commission). The Political and Security Committee discuss 
the sanction proposal in details. The last step before the approval through 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives II (COREPER II) and the 
Council is the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group where the 
representatives of EU member states negotiate the specific and concrete 
terms of each restrictive measure2.
As Francesco Guimelli notices there are different types of targeted 
sanctions. In some cases Council have only to inform European 
Parliament while in others (fighting terrorism) Council and Parliament 
1 Responsibility to Protect – Engaging Civil Society A Project of the World Federalist 
Movement’s Program on Preventing Conflicts -Protecting Civilians. International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Responsibility to Protect Official 
Site. <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2PSummary.pdf>
2 Giumelli, F. (2013). How EU sanctions work: a new narrative. Chaillot Papers, 129.
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have to define the framework for administrative measures with regard to 
capital movement1.
As we can see the sanctions adoption meets not only political 
difficulties, but also procedural. In this regard, it is possible to single out 
the situations, in which the political part of the question is not a primarily 
important:
• situations in which other world powers are not involved;
• situations which are not connected with the substantial spending 
of funds;
• situations which were the subject of consideration of the SC (with 
the adoption of Resolution);
• situations where preemptory norms of international law were 
severely broken and no one state contests this.
In other cases, the sanction adoption process will be additionally 
complicated by the political perception. It is obvious that the big part 
of world crisis where R2P can be used for their effective solution or 
minimization of tensions do not correspond the mentioned above models.
Military intervention is the last measure for addressing possible grave 
violations of human rights. Realization of the peacekeeping operations 
cause a lot of critics. In the same time, absence of international political 
will to organize the humanitarian intervention is criticized a lot to. The 
examples of Rwanda (mainly) and Syria (in some regard) are the most 
symbolic in this line. When the EU decides to realize R2P doctrine in 
the form of humanitarian intervention, the question of staff for this goal 
emerges. There are three main possibilities of mentioned staff formation: 
forces of the EU member states, NATO forces and special ad hoc EU 
units.
For the further study of this issue, I would like to turn to the examples 
of R2P missions in the past. EU used the combined forces from member 
states for the military operations in Chad and CAR. According to G. 
Grevi and D. Helly, these were the examples when “once again the EU 
could successfully project several thousand troops away from Europe 
without NATO”2. The mandate for the missions consisted the notion of 
civilians’ protection and in such way refers to the R2P doctrine. 
1 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as amended by the Treaty 
of Lisbon (2007). Foundation foк EU democracy. <http://www.eudemocrats.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/D-Reader_friendly_latest%20version.pdf>
2 Grevi, G., Helly, D., Keohane, D. (eds.) (2009). European Security and Defence 
Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009). Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 348.
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In the EU acts of reaction on Libya crisis, the R2P notion was used 
for several times. However, its use concerned unmilitary measures. 
When the SC Resolution on the no-fly zone installation became adopted, 
the absence of EU consensus caused impossibility of join military EU 
operations in Libya. In fact, Council adopted its decision concerning 
the humanitarian aid and military operation on 1 April 2011. However, 
the terms for attraction EU forces were formulated in such a way that 
the mission was never started1. The EU participation in the military part 
of the R2P realization consisted in military contingents from the EU 
member states. The NATO led the operation after the request to do so 
from the countries, which were realizing their own operations against 
Libya.
As it has been shown, the EU R2P policy depends on a number of 
political and technical preconditions. Political preconditions has internal 
and external components. External one consist of global political 
constraining factors. Internal component derive from the different foreign 
policies of the EU member states. This lead to the delays in adoption 
of common strategy and set of instruments for the stabilization of the 
situations in problem regions. Technical preconditions are connected 
with the complicated procedure of the common decision adoption on 
sanctions or military intervention. This is the fee of the EU to be named 
Union but not a federation.
In contemporary global misbalances where the EU took an active 
military part, it actioned through the ad hoc military mission or through 
the coordinated military contingent of member states or in the frames of 
NATO forces. As far as the level of integration in the foreign policy in the 
EU is not sufficiently high, it is not good time for creation the permanent 
EU forces. It seems logical to come up to the creation of such forces 
through the convergence of the state positions about R2P doctrine. By this 
I mean the creation of comprehensive stepwise strategy2 of reacting on 
the most severe human rights violations. The strategy should contain the 
1 Council stated that the Union should, if requested by the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), conduct in the framework of the 
Common Security and Defense Policy a military operation (EUFOR Libya), in order 
to support humanitarian assistance in the region. See: Council Decision 2011/210/
CFSP. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:089:001
7:0020:en:PDF>
2 See Kirn, A. (2011). The European Union’s Role in Promoting and Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect in Africa: Turning Political Commitments into Effective 
Action. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers, 1.
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detailed methodology and toolbox for early warning, the characteristics 
of criteria’s for the severe human rights violation definition, mechanisms 
of coordination with the UN, Guidebook for the military units about the 
applied international humanitarian and human rights law etc1.
PART III.  
EU PARTICIPATION IN THE CREATION  
AND ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL  
AND HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS’ AD HOC
EU Parliament in the Resolution from 22 May 2008 on Darfur Crisis 
referred to the R2P norm and strongly condemned Sudan’s failure to 
cooperate with the ICC2. This is the only mention of the International 
Criminal Court in the EU documents on R2P. In the same time, the EU is 
one of the strongest and consecutive supporters of the idea of international 
criminal justice. All its member states are signatories of the Rome Statute 
1998. International agreements of the EU consist provisions with the 
obligation for partners to ratify Rome Statute (for instance the Cotonou 
Agreement3 with African states, Association Agreements with Ukraine, 
Georgia and Moldova4).
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) in its report names the creation of ad hoc criminal tribunals 
and participation of the ICC in prosecution and acquisition of persons 
1 See also: A Future Agenda for the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) (2009). Working Paper.
2 European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2008 on Sudan and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). European Parliament official site. <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0238+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>
3 The Cotonou agreement. European Commission official site. <http://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/where/acp/overview/documents/devco-cotonou-consol-europe-aid-2012_
en.pdf>
4 See: Art. 6 of the Agreement with Moldova and Georgia, Art. 8 of the Agreement 
with Ukraine. EU-Moldova Association Agreement. EUEA official site. <http://
eeas.europa.eu/moldova/assoagreement/pdf/md-aa-title-ii-political-dialogue-
reform-cooperation-field-foreign-security-policy_en.pdf>; EU-Georgia Association 
Agreement. EUEA official site. <http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/assoagreement/pdf/
ge-aa-title-ii-political-dialogue-reform-cooperation-in-field-of-foreign-security-
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responsible for international crimes among the legal measures in 
realization of the R2P1.
In the regard of the mentioned above, it seems perspective for 
the EU to develop actively the legal direction of the R2P. Such legal 
direction can be traced on the example of EULEX (the EU mission 
to Kosovo) which is the first EU mission that together with the aim of 
protecting civilians directed on the establishment of the rule of law 
through the corpus of professional judges that was sent from the EU. 
In April 2014, the EU representatives declared that it plans to create the 
ad hoc international tribunal in Kosovo focusing exclusively on crimes 
allegedly committed by Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian rebels during their 
war with Serbia in 1998-1999 in the nearest future2. This tribunal can 
become an effective mechanism for the realization of the R2P principle 
by the EU. Every new international court costs a lot for their creators. 
The model of internationalized courts established itself as a thrifty and 
effective form for the internationally controlled justice. International 
control means fairness, transparency and adequacy of justice but not the 
latent attempt to create an empire. Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia 
and Hercegovina – is a good Balkan example of mixed tribunal with the 
attraction of national and foreign judges3.
International criminal tribunal for Kosovo possibly will become 
the first EUs’ pen test in realization of R2P in such form. As far as this 
method of influence on post-crisis region do not demand the fast reaction 
and it is not as controversial as other R2P measures, it seems possible for 
the EU to use it more actively.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I tried to show that state sovereignty cannot be understood 
as a indulgency for unhuman actions. R2P doctrine describes sovereignty 
as an obligation but not the right. This perception is very human-oriented 
and similar to the theories of the sociologists of international law. The 
EU mentioned the R2P in several its documents. Moreover, it used the 
1 Responsibility to Protect – Engaging Civil Society a Project of the World 
Federalist Movement’s Program on Preventing Conflicts -Protecting Civilians. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. <http://www.
responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2PSummary.pdf>
2 EU Creating Court for Kosovo War Crimes. EPOCH Times. <http://www.
theepochtimes.com/n3/601421-eu-creating-court-for-kosovo-war-crimes/>
3 Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Official site. <http://www.hrc.
ba/ENGLISH/DEFAULT.HTM>
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conception of civilian protection for the mandate for several its missions 
abroad. In the same time, the R2P doctrine is not included in a proper way 
to the defense and security strategy of the EU. The military intervention 
as a most strong measure for the protection of civilians is possible for 
the EU. Nevertheless, the question rises about the forces that the EU can 
use for military missions. It seems impossible to create in nearest future 
the permanent EU forces. One of the most perspective ways of the R2P 
implementation of the R2P for the EU is the creation and participation in 
the international and mixed criminal tribunals.
